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The Policy Agenda of Native
Peoples from World War II
to the 1969 White Paper
John F. Leslie
The two decades following the end of the World War II are critical to our
understanding of modern Canadian Indian policy development. In these years
the trends and portents of contemporary Native policy issues—policy
consultation, band governance, settlement of land claims, and the assertion
of treaty and Aboriginal rights—became discernible. How these issues were
viewed by the public and handled by policy-makers is instructive, since
elements of this Indian agenda persist as unfinished business.
During the quarter century from the end of World War II to the
publication of the Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy
(the White Paper) in June 1969, Indian leaders, bands, and regional and
national political organizations presented to the federal government (in
parliamentary and other official fora) a national political agenda. This agenda
included proposals to revise the Indian Act, improve reserve conditions,
enhance economic opportunity, expand social and health care services,
restructure Indian education, and to advance reserve-based “self-
government.” More controversial, and of less interest to non-Native policy
actors, were persistent Native demands for discussion of Aboriginal rights,
the recognition of treaty rights and the concept of a treaty relationship, and
the settlement of longstanding land claims.1
Many of these policy initiatives had been developed by Indian leaders
and their political associations—at local and national meetings throughout
Canada—during the 1920s, 1930s, and early 1940s.2 However, the war and
severe economic depression had effectively stifled their articulation to a
broader audience. Towards the end of World War II, Canadian politicians and
bureaucrats gathered to discuss post-war social and economic
reconstruction.3 It was within the political context of rebuilding modern
Canada that the conditions of Aboriginal peoples, and their reform agenda,
came to the attention of the general public.4
1
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In the immediate post-war era, the fundamental message of national
Indian leaders—the likes of Andrew Paull, John Tootoosis, Rev. Peter Kelly,
John Gambler, William Scow, Joe Dion, and George Manuel—to politicians
and Indian Affairs Branch officials was that Indian people wanted to retain
their “Indianness” and not assimilate into the dominant society.5 On occasion,
traditionalist Iroquois groups asserted a more aggressive “autonomist”
position that reflected their historic role as military “allies,” not subjects of
the Crown.6 Common to all tribal groups was the desire to retain their
distinctive traditions, culture and languages; treaty rights and benefits; and
other inherent rights accruing to them as Aboriginal peoples.
The problem for Native peoples throughout this period, and beyond, was
that they remained on the periphery of political power and decision making.
Political neophytes on the national stage—lacking sustained funding for
associational activities—they were subject to the whims of the government
agenda and to the machinations of Indian Affairs Branch staff. To be sure,
individuals including Tommy Douglas, John Laurie, Morris Shumiatcher,
Ruth Gorman, and John Diefenbaker could be relied upon to provide timely
political support.7 Later in the 1950s, philanthropic groups such as the
National Commission on the Indian Canadian (1954) and its successor, the
Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada (1960), took up various aspects of the
Indian cause.8 Academics—Tom McIlwraith, R.W. Dunning, Harry
Hawthorn, Stewart Jamieson, and Cyril Belshaw—also became active in the
1950s and 1960s.9 They produced important anthropological and socio-
logical studies that supported Native cultural retention, and suggested new
strategies to facilitate political, social, and economic integration. On a regular
basis, journalists such as Dick Snell of the Calgary Herald wrote articles
describing atrocious reserve conditions and bungled Indian departmental
operations.10
The Indian reliance on sympathetic “outsiders” had implications for the
course and content of Indian policy throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed,
the various “Friends of the Indian” associations had their own particular
ideas and plans for Native people, which were often at odds with the Native
viewpoint.11 As a general rule, elements of the Indian agenda that promoted
integration into Canadian society were supported by non-Natives. This
political support and pressure translated into government action. Beginning
in the mid-1940s, and in years thereafter, various pensions, allowances, and
social services were gradually extended to Native peoples living on
reserves.12 There was some modest government support for economic
development projects and reserve infrastructure was improved. In addition,
there was more money to enhance and promote Indian education. In keeping
with “training for citizenship,” and the Aboriginal desire for greater “self-
government,” additional powers were delegated to band councils so that they
could operate along the lines of rural municipalities. Even the new Indian Act
of 1951 contained reforms: discretionary ministerial powers were reduced,
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many penalty clauses were eliminated, and the historic ban on dances,
traditional ceremonies, and land claims was lifted.13 Later, in the early 1960s,
under John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative government, Indian
people obtained the federal vote (1960) and compulsory enfranchisement
was removed as a provision of the Indian Act (1961).
There were certain planks in the Native agenda that were not
enthusiastically received by non-Native supporters. These were assertions of
Aboriginal rights, demands that Indian treaty promises be honoured, and calls
for the settlement of land claims. Many decision-makers looked askance at
these rights demands because, in their view, and in the view of many White
supporters, a “rights agenda” was socially and politically disruptive, and, as
such, did not fit with the major policy thrust of the federal government,
which was Indian integration. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s,
Native people battled to have the discussion of Aboriginal rights, recognition
of treaties, and land claims issues placed on the federal government’s
political agenda. They met with varying degrees of success.
The notion of Aboriginal rights was not on the government’s policy radar
screen in the late 1940s or 1950s. The idea that a particular group in society
should have special rights because they were the first arrivals was anathema
to mainstream thinking.14 In the period under discussion, Aboriginal rights
were asserted in relation to land and natural resources—for example the
unresolved B.C. land question.15 Rights were also asserted in regard to
border-crossing privileges under the guise of the 1794 Jay Treaty.16
Aboriginal rights in the form of assertions of tribal sovereignty were
proclaimed by certain traditional Iroquois nations in Quebec and Ontario.17
These “pretensions” were dismissed by the bureaucrats and only served to
confound politicians who were having trouble fathoming treaty issues. In
1948, Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, then Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources
(Indian Affairs was a branch), characterized Indian leaders who espoused a
treaty and Aboriginal rights agenda as “venal and self-serving.”18 During the
1950s, every effort was made by government officials to head off the
discussion of Native rights at consultation meetings, even if that meant
predetermining the agenda, the shape of the negotiating table, Aboriginal
seating arrangements (1951),19 and altering post-facto the minutes of the
actual meetings (1953).20
The discussion of Aboriginal rights, and what these rights might
encompass, remained a thorny political question throughout the 1960s. In the
minutes of the 1968 consultation meetings on the Indian Act, Indian leaders
requested constitutional protection for their Aboriginal and treaty rights.
These demands were totally dismissed in Trudeau’s White Paper on Indian
policy.21 It was not until 1973, when the Supreme Court of Canada handed
down a decision in the Calder Case, that the national political and legal
debate concerning Aboriginal rights was renewed with greater intensity.
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The settling of land claims had a more satisfying outcome for Native
people. The Special Joint Committee on the Indian Act (1946–1948), after
three years of hearings, recommended the establishment of an Indian Claims
Commission.22 In 1949, the Indian Affairs Branch conducted a search of its
files and archival records and prepared a lengthy report on the potential
nature of these claims. The author noted that many were of a “specific”
nature relating to reserve land surrenders, unfulfilled treaty provisions, and
the misappropriation of band trust funds. Other claims related to areas of
Canada where there were no land cession treaties. There the Indian residents
claimed they still had unextinguished rights to the land and natural resources.
British Columbia was cited as a prime example, as well as areas of Atlantic
Canada and the North.23
In the summer of 1950 the Indian Affairs Branch prepared a one-page
Cabinet submission, which neither recommended nor rejected the idea of
establishing a claims commission.24 Minister Walter Harris did not like the
idea of an expensive claims commission, preferring to remove Section 141
from the Indian Act, which would permit Native claimants to take their
grievances to the Exchequer Court (now the Federal Court). Harris favoured
court action to settle Native claims because Indian people would gain
experience in using the judicial process, an option available to all Canadian
citizens.25 The experience would be citizenship training for Indian people and
promote their political integration.
For about a decade claims matters rested. Then, around 1960, the
Blackfoot (Siksika) Indians brought a series of claims before the Exchequer
Court via a Petition of Right. About the same time, the Six Nations at
Brantford, Ontario, submitted land claims and related issues dating from pre-
Confederation times. These Native initiatives, coupled with a positive
recommendation for a claims commission from a second Joint Committee on
Indian Administration (1959–1961), prompted politicians and civil servants
to reassess the merits of a commission.26 With Prime Minister Diefenbaker
enthusiastic, Minister Ellen Fairclough engaged, and a somnolent
bureaucracy mobilized, the establishment of an Indian Claims Commission
became a government priority in the early summer of 1961.
In June 1961, Dr. George Davidson, Deputy Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration (Indian Affairs was a branch in 1950), presented Minister Ellen
Fairclough with a lengthy memorandum that provided a rationale for
government action.27 The memorandum was prepared by Indian Affairs
Branch staff and it reflected the prevailing corporate wisdom: Indian people
would be more willing to integrate into Canadian society, and have greater
trust in Indian administration, if longstanding claims and grievances relating
to land and treaties were dealt with by an independent body. In other words,
Indian people had to settle with the past in order to come to terms with their
future progress. The minister’s reaction, written on the upper right-hand
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margin was: “Okay. Let’s do it then.” The Canadian land claims experience
had begun.
It is useful to briefly examine the Commission’s proposed Terms of
Reference, which were approved by Cabinet in October 1962. There were
four categories of claims:
1. any claim arising out of the acquisition of original Indian lands
where the Crown and Indians did not come to an agreement for the
extinguishment of the so-called Indian interest or title to the lands;
2. claims based upon alleged non-fulfilment of terms of a treaty;
3. claims based upon any alleged violation of trust arising out of any
treaty or surrender in relation to the use, management, or
disposition of Indian lands or money; and
4. other claims that might have no foundation in law or might be open
to defeat upon a technical or formal objection, but which might
merit consideration upon grounds of honourable dealings and
fairness and good conscience.28
A three-person commission would hear evidence (including oral testimony)
relating to the above claims and render expeditious judgements. The claims
commission was to have a life expectancy of ten to fifteen years. There were
no settlement cost projections.29
Draft Bill C-123 was prepared for presentation to Parliament. However,
Diefenbaker’s government fell in February 1963 and was subsequently
defeated at the April general election. The Liberals resurrected the idea of a
claims commission and prepared draft legislation in the form of Bill C-130.
Extensive consultations with Indian people were launched in 1964. However,
a federal election was called in 1965, and, once again, claims commission
legislation died on the House of Commons Order Paper. It is interesting to
note that when the subject of Native claims again came up for review in the
winter of 1969, the Trudeau government (primarily officials in the Prime
Minister’s Office and Privy Council Office) totally dismissed Aboriginal
rights and title claims, and reduced the scope and focus for other claims to
address “lawful obligations.”30 This narrow legal definition is still at the heart
of the Specific Claims policy and process.
While Native claims arising from the non-fulfilment of treaty provisions
were to be dealt with through a prospective claims commission, the role and
place of Indian treaties—both in Aboriginal and Canadian society—
remained unresolved and was a contentious issue for non-Native policy
actors and various “Friends of the Indian” groups.31 During the years from
1945 to 1968, however, there was a perceptible evolution in public thought
regarding Indian treaties, treaty rights, and Native peoples. For most of the
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1940s and the 1950s, politicians, bureaucrats, and philanthropic bodies
regarded the formal recognition of historic Indian treaties, and a treaty
relationship, as a barrier to the social and political integration of Aboriginal
peoples because, in their view, treaties harkened back to “the old days and old
ways.”32 In these early years, the focus of government officials was the
practical implementation of treaty rights to hunt, fish, and trap. This was to
ensure that Indian families in remote areas did not starve or have to go on
provincial welfare rolls.
In western Canada, the comprehensive numbered treaties presented
problems on a number of fronts. Six numbered land cession treaties had been
negotiated in the period between 1871 and 1876 when there was no
consolidated Indian Act legislation. For many Plains groups, the treaty
relationship—not the Indian Act—defined their special “nation-to-nation”
relationship with the Crown. In their view, the Indian Act, Indian
administration, and the system of Indian agents were illegitimate.33 Two
respected Saskatchewan Indian political organizations, which espoused a
“treaties only” relationship with the federal government, were the Queen
Victoria Treaty Protective Association (representing seventeen Indian bands)
and the Qu’Appelle Indian Advisory Council (representing six Indian bands).
To influential non-Native policy actors, and social organizations such as
the Indian-Eskimo Association, the treaty relationship perpetuated the
wrong-headed notion of a special political and legal status for Indians, not
their political and social integration.34 Second, and this argument cut to the
philosophical heart of the problem, the promotion of Indian treaties and
treaty rights as a vehicle for defining social relations suggested that “treaty
Indians” enjoyed an enhanced degree of citizenship within Canadian society.
They possessed rights and benefits not available to non-treaty Indians and
Whites. At the time, despite the pluralistic nature of post-war Canadian
society, the concept of an asymmetrical Canadian citizenship was at odds
with the liberal democratic values of most decision-makers (indeed society
at large), which emphasized equality before the law.35
For the historian concerned with the evolution of “ideas,” it is often
difficult to identify the precise moment when society’s “thinking” changes
on a particular subject. However, this process did occur in the late 1950s in
regard to recognizing the potential “integrative” value of the treaty
relationship. How did this come about? The political context is most
important. The emergent post-war welfare state sponsored social programs
and benefits, which not all Canadians enjoyed or were entitled to; for
example, veterans payments, mothers’ allowance, pensions for the elderly,
and blind persons benefits.36
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Academics such as Dr. Harry Hawthorn, Cyril Belshaw and Stewart
Jamieson also contributed to the debate. In the mid-1950s, Dr. Hawthorn and
his research team at the University of British Columbia was commissioned
by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to prepare an in-depth
study of Indian administration in British Columbia. In his thousand-page
report, Dr. Hawthorn proposed measures to advance Indian integration.
Implicit in Hawthorn’s analysis was that many B.C. Aboriginal societies—
including other groups across Canada—saw themselves as distinct political
entities with unique rights, economies, cultures, collective goals, and
citizenship. Hawthorn’s message, of course, challenged Canadian post-war
sociopolitical values that emphasized equality and a common citizenship.
However, the theory had been advanced by a credible outside authority that
Indian integration could be hastened if their respective rights, cultures, and
traditions were assured of retention. Dr. Hawthorn’s research was formally
published in 1958 by the University of Toronto Press as The Indians of
British Columbia: A Study of Contemporary Social Adjustment.
Dr. Hawthorn’s investigation was timely because John Diefenbaker, a
Prairie populist familiar with Native concerns, had recently become prime
minister. Moreover, a second Joint Committee was scheduled to begin
investigative hearings into the state of Indian administration in 1959. The
first parliamentary committee, which sat from 1946 to 1948, had recast the
traditional nineteenth-century policy paradigm of Indian assimilation into
one of Indian integration. The second committee, which sat until 1961, heard
testimony from Indian leaders and Aboriginal political associations
concerning the importance to Indian people of the treaty relationship. In its
final report, committee members implicitly endorsed the notion of a
differentiated Indian citizenship.37 This idea was not based on a new,
emergent concept of “Aboriginality,” or on any formal recognition of
Aboriginal rights. In part, the transformation occurred because members of
the dominant society had finally acknowledged Canada’s cultural pluralism
(through the indirect help of the Massey Commission), and the potential
contribution non-traditional cultures could make to the social and political
mosaic. The committee’s musings and policy recommendations were not
official government policy. However, by the early 1960s, the concept of
Indian people as “citizens plus” had been broached.
When the Liberals under Lester Pearson came to power in the spring of
1963, the political dynamics in Canada had altered considerably. Separatism
was on the rise in Quebec. Concerned with issues of national unity and
political survival, the federal enthusiasm for Indian policy issues waned.
Instead, Privy Council officials recommended that Indian conditions should
be studied within the context of a Canada-wide “war on poverty.” As a
consequence of these deliberations, in 1964 the Hawthorn-Tremblay
Commission was established to study Indian social, economic, and political
issues.
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When the commission reported its findings in 1967, one of its
recommendations was that Indian people should be accorded status as
“citizens plus.”38 By this term they meant that Indian people should receive
the same social benefits and economic opportunities as other Canadians, but,
at the same time, they could retain any rights-based benefits accruing to them
as “Indians”; for example, no taxation on reserve income, and any special
considerations contained in the provisions of historic Indian treaties and
other agreements with the Crown. The Hawthorn-Tremblay report also
recommended an activist role for the newly created Department of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development (1966) to promote Indian advancement
and special status.39 In a significant way, the Hawthorn-Tremblay
Commission endorsed the revised course of Indian policy, which had been
gradually taking shape since the late 1950s.
Within two years the progress and trust that had been developing for
twenty years  evaporated. In the summer of 1969, after more than a year of
Indian Act consultation meetings across Canada, the federal government
brought in its Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy. The
“new policy” was straight nineteenth-century Indian assimilation: the concept
of Aboriginal rights was denied, treaty rights would be terminated, land
claims would be adjudicated by a Claims Commissioner, Indian status was
to be eliminated, Indian reserve land tenure revised, and the operations of the
Indian Department brought to a close within five years. A termination
psychosis gripped Native people. A flood of Indian-authored “Red,” “Beige,”
and “Brown” policy papers, demonstrations, and university teach-ins forced
the formal withdrawal of the White Paper proposals a year later.40 The White
Paper fiasco had revealed the bankrupt state of federal Indian policy.
What Indian people and their supporters failed to negotiate in the 1960s,
judicial activism eventually attained. In the last thirty years a distinct body
of Native case law has emerged that has established the criteria for
demonstrating proof of Aboriginal title and rights (who holds these rights is
still in question), and how provisions of the historic Indian treaties are to be
viewed and interpreted.41 These Supreme Court decisions have helped
Canadians to understand better the social and political implications of Section
35 constitutional rights. It has been the high courts with the help of legal
scholars—not parliamentarians, public servants, or interested citizens
engaged in public debate—who have been active in framing the political
agenda and related issues.42 These judicial pronouncements have encouraged
Native peoples and their leaders to seek a greater share of political power and
decision making. A permanent Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs,
comprehensive land claim negotiations, inherent right to self-government
discussions, joint Indian-government policy task forces, and Indian program
devolution hold out the prospect, if not the promise, of Native people gaining
control over their own destiny.
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In the never-ending government quest to end the cycle of dependency, to
somehow incorporate Indian people into Canadian society, an often
acrimonious public debate concerning the question of individual rights
versus collective Native rights—derived from Indian treaty rights and the
treaty relationship, modern land claims settlements, and self-government
agreements—has surfaced and threatens to poison Aboriginal relations with
the dominant society. Whether contemporary Canadian society, still imbued
with the liberal democratic principles espoused by the White Paper, can
accommodate collectivist Native aspirations and notions of asymmetrical
citizenship is a moot point.43 Until this fundamental issue is resolved, Indian
policy will remain a highly contentious and problematic field of Canadian
public policy.
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